On the Security of Y-00 under Fast Correlation and Other Attacks on the
  Key by Yuen, Horace P. & Nair, Ranjith
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
06
08
02
8v
2 
 3
0 
O
ct
 2
00
6
On the Security of Y-00 under Fast Correlation
and Other Attacks on the Key
Horace P. Yuen ∗and Ranjith Nair
Center for Photonic Communication and Computing
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Department of Physics and Astronomy
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208
October 11, 2018
Abstract
The potential weakness of the Y-00 direct encryption protocol when
the encryption box ENC is not chosen properly is demonstrated in a fast
correlation attack by S. Donnet et al in Phys. Lett. A 356 (2006) 406-
410. In this paper, we show how this weakness can be eliminated with a
proper design of ENC. In particular, we present a Y-00 configuration that
is more secure than AES under known-plaintext attack. It is also shown
that under any ciphertext-only attack, full information-theoretic security
on the Y-00 seed key is obtained for any ENC when proper deliberate
signal randomization is employed.
1 Introduction
The quantum-noise based direct encryption protocol Y-00, called αη in our
earlier papers [1-6], was repeatedly misrepresented in previous criticisms, but
that situation has apparently changed with our recent papers [7-9]. For the first
time, a meaningful attack on Y-00 type protocols beyond exhaustive search has
been developed in [10]. A fast correlation attack (FCA) was presented that was
shown to succeed by simulations for moderate signal levels when the ENC box
in Y-00 is a LFSR (linear feedback shift register) of a few taps and length up
to 32. Even though such Y-00 is already insecure against what we call assisted
brute-force search [9] due to the small seed key size |K| ≤ 32, such FCA is
of interest as it brings forth the whole issue of Y-00 seed key security against
similar and other attacks.
The attack in [10] is geared toward only the experiment reported in [3]. We
have emphasized all along [2, 4, 6] that the use of LFSR in the reported exper-
iments was just for proof of principle demonstration, that the ENC box must
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be chosen appropriately in a final design, and that other techniques need to be
deployed for proper security. To quote from [6], “Similar to encryption based on
nonlinearly combining the LFSR’s, Eve can launch a correlation attack using
the following strategy: . . . many of the LFSR’s could be trivially attacked.”
Thus, we were aware of the possible weakness of some ENC and in particular of
FCA type attacks. Indeed, Hirota and Kurosawa [11] have already desribed a
counter-measure to FCA via a “keyed mapper”, the incorporation of which in
ASK-signal Y-00 [12] has been developed and is being tested. Generally speak-
ing, it is important to study LFSR-based Y-00 despite its possible weakness,
because LFSR is a practically convenient choice in various applications similar
to the situation in standard cryptography.
In this paper, we first briefly describe general attacks on the Y-00 seed key
as a problem of decoding in real noise – a viewpoint which includes all FCA’s.
For both ciphertext-only attacks (CTA) and known-plaintext attacks (KPA), we
show that Y-00 may be considered as a classical stream cipher, the ENC box,
with real physical noise added on top. We comment on the possible defenses
involving just a properly chosen LFSR, or an added keyed mapper, or with a
keyed connection polynomial for the LFSR. We describe an AES-based Y-00
that is more secure against KPA than AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
alone, in the sense that if it is broken then AES is also broken but not the other
way around. The practical security advantage of such AES-based Y-00 will be
indicated. Finally, for CTA, we show that Deliberate Signal Randomization
(DSR) introduced in [2] provides full information-theoretic security on the Y-00
seed key for any ENC. We hope that these results would establish beyond doubt
that Y-00 is an important cryptosystem to consider in theory and in practice.
2 Attacks on Y-00 seed key
Consider the original quantum-noise randomized cipher Y-00 [1, 2] as depicted
in Fig. 1. Alice encodes each data bit into a 2M−ary phase-shifted coherent
state in a qumode of energy α20. A seed key K of bit length |K| is used to drive
a conventional stream cipher ENC to produce a running key K ′ that is used to
determine, for each qumode carrying the bit, which pair of antipodal coherent
states, referred to as a basis, is to be used as a binary phase-shift keying (BPSK)
signal set for Bob. With a synchronous ENC at the receiver, Bob discriminates
the BPSK signals for each qumode by an appropriate receiver. With a differ-
ential (DPSK) implementation [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6], there is no need to phase lock
between Alice and Bob as is true in ordinary communications.
The optimum quantum receiver performance for both Bob and Eve is the same
as in the non-differential case in principle, the differential implementation being
a practical convenience. Even with a full copy of the quantum state granted
to Eve in our KCQ approach of performance analysis [2, 7, 8, 9], security on
the data is nearly perfect when the seed key induced correlation is neglected
[1]. Generally, it is a horrendous problem with yet no solution for meaningfully
2
Figure 1: Left – Overall schematic of the Y-00 encryption system. Right –
Depiction of two of M bases with interleaved logical bit mappings.
quantifying the data security of a symmetric-key cipher. In current practice,
it is assumed that CTA on the data is not a problem if |K| is “large”, and
attention is focused on KPA on the key.
For conventional or standard [8, 9] ciphers, the key is usually completely
protected from CTA for uniformly random data. This is, however, not the
case for the bare Y-00 [2, 7, 8, 9]. In this paper, we address both CTA and
KPA on the Y-00 seed key, the (classical) ciphertext being obtained from some
quantum measurement on the qumodes assumed to be in Eve’s possession. It
is seen from Fig. 1 that a CTA or KPA on the Y-00 seed key is equivalent to
the corresponding attack on the standard stream cipher ENC with its output
stream observed in noise resulting from the coherent state randomization of the
signal phase. Thus, it is equivalent to a CTA or KPA on the ENC alone as
a stream cipher but with noise on top. The connection between the running
key bits K ′ and the basis, called the “mapper” [5, 6, 11], a crucial component
of Y-00, and the noise effect on K ′ are described in [6, 10]. In a FCA on a
conventional stream cipher composed of, say, a nonlinear combination of the
outputs of a bank of m LFSR’s, one focuses on one LFSR Li at a time and
looks for correlation between the final stream cipher output K ′ and the output
k′i of Li. Thus, even though the complete cipher is nonrandom, K
′ constitutes
a noisy observation of k′i from which a good estimate of k
′
i may perhaps be
obtained. Such a divide-and-conquer strategy can be repeated to yield all the
keys ki for each Li. For Y-00, there is real noise from the coherent states, but
a similar FCA can be launched if there is a significant correlation between K ′
and the observed 2M -ary signal, as obtained, say, by heterodyning.
In general, attack on the Y-00 seed key is exactly a decoding problem on a
memoryless channel for both CTA and KPA. This can be seen by regarding the
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seed key as information bits and the observed sequence of 2M -ary signals trans-
lated by the mapper to K ′ as the codeword, with independent coherent-state
noise for each qumode so that the memoryless channel alphabet has size log
2
2M
in a CTA and log2M in a KPA. Note that this code from ENC, as in the case
of AES, could be nonlinear with no useful linear approximation, making linear
decoding not a viable attack. It is not known whether information-theoretic
security may be obtained in Y-00 for a properly designed ENC, i.e., whether
a (decoding) algorithm may be found that would succeed in determining the
seed key with some nonvanishing probability [8, 9]. And there is the further
question, if such an algorithm exists, of its complexity as the general syndrome
decoding of even a linear code is exponential. In contrast, for KPA on standard
“nondegenerate” nonrandom ciphers, the key is actually uniquely determined
at a bit length n1 = nd, the nondegeneracy distance [8, 9] which is often not
very long. Thus, such cipher has no information-theoretic security against KPA,
although there is still the problem of attack complexity in finding K that may
allow complexity-based security which can be practically as good as information-
theoretic security [8]. The key point in this connection is that randomization
introduces real noise that is otherwise absent in a nonrandom cipher, signifying
its role in adding security to KPA.
For standard stream ciphers built upon LFSR’s, the class of FCA described
above is powerful enough to break them for sufficiently long observed lengthN of
the output. However, the complexity of all known FCA algorithms is exponential
in either the memory needed or the number t of tap coefficients in the LFSR
[13]. Thus, practically there are LFSR-based stream ciphers that are not broken
by any known attack when the LFSR length |K| and t are sufficiently large.
Shorter LFSR’s or ones with long |K| and with few taps are more convenient
and cheaper to use in practice, but are vulnerable to computationally intensive
but feasible attacks. If such LFSR is used in the ENC in Y-00, the cipher
becomes vulnerable even for moderate signal level if long enough N is employed
when that does not lead to an undue increase in memory required. For the
|K| = 32 single LFSR case reported in [10], only N = 1500 is needed in a CTA
to undermine the system at the signal level α2
0
∼ 1.5×104, roughly the numbers
used in [3]. The convolutional-code based algorithm chosen in [10] is not suited
to attacking long |K| LFSR with a few taps, and thus would not be able to
break the |K| = 4400 and t = 3 LFSR used in our system in [5, 14]. However,
a different FCA would no doubt be able to break that system, such as those
designed for small t.
3 Defenses Against Fast Correlation Attacks
We have already observed that one may use practical LFSR that resists known
FCA in the ENC of Y-00. There are many other ways to defeat such and even
more general attacks on the Y-00 seed key, as we will discuss in the rest of this
paper.
First, a properly designed deterministic mapper that determines the 2M−ary
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signal from the running key K ′ would spread the noise into the different bit po-
sitions of K ′(m), increasing the minimum complexity of attacks. The mapper
may also be keyed, e.g., the mapper function may be chosen for each qumode
from the running key K ′m from another ENCm with another seed key Km. This
results in a product cipher of ENC in noise and ENCm, for which no obvious
modification of the FCA can be made that does not involve exponential search
over Km. In particular, one cannot plot Fig. 3 in [10] which is the basic starting
point of their attack. This defense has already been proposed [11], although
there is “correlation immunity” for such ciphers only under an approximation.
Secondly, the connection polynomial in the LFSR can be keyed, i.e., chosen
randomly from an exponential number of possibilities. The known FCA’s on
LFSR all require knowledge of the LFSR connection polynomial. In a future
paper, we will present information-theoretic analysis of the effect of a keyed
connection polynomial. Such ciphers can clearly be implemented in software,
and to a considerable extent in hardware with field programmable logic, thus
retaining much of the convenience of LFSR in practical applications. We do
not believe information-theoretic security can be obtained this way, but it may
greatly increase the complexity of at least FCA type attacks, thus providing
useful practical security in some situations.
Thirdly, we now give an ENC design for Y-00 that leads to exponential com-
plexity for CTA according to current knowledge, and more security that AES
for KPA generally. Consider the ENC of Fig. 2 where a bank of m parallel AES
in a stream cipher mode is used to provide the m = log2M bits running key
segment K ′(m) which determines, through the mapper, the basis of a qumode.
Typically in our previous experimental demonstrations, m ∼ 10 and |K| is in
the thousands. Thus each Ki may be readily chosen to be of 256 bits. Under
heterodyne or any other quantum measurement by Eve, the result is a noisy ver-
sion of K ′(m) with independent coherent-state induced randomization for each
qumode. According to the present state of knowledge, no KPA on AES is better
than exhaustive (exponential) search [15]. Even in a divide-and-conquer type
attack as in FCA, so that a single AES is to be considered, one needs to deal
with the KPA problem of artifical noise from such strategy with the addition of
real coherent-state noise, in a CTA on the Y-00 seed key. Let N1 be the length
of the qumode sequence used for the attack, so that Eve may parallelize N/N1
attacks simultaneously from the total length N . It is clear that even without
noise, the attack complexity remains exponential for any realistic N ≤ 280 and
any N1. In a KPA, the comparison is to be made with the same N1 for no
parallelization. Thus, Y-00 is equivalent to AES in a stream cipher mode with
output observed in noise, thus harder than AES alone which does not have the
decoding in noise problem. In particular, it is easily seen that if the Y-00 in the
configuration of Fig. 2 can be broken, then each AESi itself can be broken.
The question arises as to what constitutes a fair comparison between a given
stream cipher ENC versus Y-00 on top of ENC. A different configuration was
given for ENC in [9], where a single classical stream cipher (say AES) is used
without parallelization but is adjusted to give the same clock rate for encrypting
each data bit. The present scheme appears simpler in principle and more secure
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Figure 2: Parallel AES for ENC in Y-00
in practice when AES is used in ENC, because the functionality of multiple AES
in parallel cannot be replaced by a single AES. However, with such paralleliza-
tion for maintaining the same clock rate as AES (or ENC alone), the question
arises as to whether the added security from Y-00 can be obtained from, say,
nonlinearly combining the parallel AES’s. This question cannot be answered
until security is precisely defined and quantified. However, it may be observed
in this connection that there is no known attack developed for AES observed in
noise, and the intrinsic nonlinearity of AES renders all known decoding attacks
inapplicable.
The major qualitative advantage of Y-00 [8, 9] compared to a standard non-
random cipher is that the quantum noise automatically provides high speed true
randomization not available otherwise, thus giving it a different kind of protec-
tion from nonrandom ciphers. Furthermore, one has to attack such physics-
based cryptosystem at the communication line with physical (measurement)
equipment, which is not available to everyone at every place, whereas one only
needs to sit at a computer terminal to attack conventional ciphers. In this con-
nection, it may be mentioned that the high rate heterodyne attack needed on
Y-00 is currently not quite technologically feasible, though it may be in the
not-too-far future.
Y-00 can be employed to realize these benefits not available otherwise. How-
ever, if it is intrinsically less secure than conventional ciphers, its utility would
be in serious doubt. The configuration of Fig. 2 shows this is not the case – it
can in fact be more secure that ENC or AESi by itself. There is also no known
attack applicable to AES in noise.
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4 Deliberate Signal Randomization
In contrast to a nondegenerate nonrandom classical cipher for which the key
is completely protected in the information-theoretic sense against CTA when
the data is uniformly random [8, 9], there is little distinction between CTA and
KPA for the bare Y-00. Only a factor of 2 in the per qumode alphabet size is
obtained in KPA versus CTA as indicated above, and expounded in [9]. The
question arises as to whether full information-theoretic security against CTA
can be restored by modifying the bare Y-00. The authors of [10] appear to be
pessimistic on the possibility of achieving this. To quote: “While randomization
methods might increase the security level, it remains to be seen if they will
provide perfect secrecy.” In the following, we show how this is possible with
Deliberate Signal Randomization (DSR) independently of the mechanism of
running key generation.
The reason why the seed key cannot be attacked in CTA is clear for an
additive stream cipher with uniformly random data. The “channel” between the
seed key and the output observation has zero capacity due to the data which acts
as random noise. In particular, it is clear that no FCA can be launched. The
coherent-state noise in Y-00 is not big enough for high signal level to produce a
similar effect. However, further randomization may in principle be produced to
achieve this end, both classically and quantum mechanically.
Since the coherent-state noise in Y-00 can in principle be replaced, in an
equivalent classical system, by deliberate randomization of the classical signal
from Alice as we have repeatedly emphasized [2, 7, 8, 9], we first consider this
classical situation. Let θs be the signal point on the circle of Fig. 1, x the data
bit, k′ the running key segment that determines the basis. Before deliberate
or noise randomization, θs(x, k
′) is uniquely determined by x and k′. From
θs one randomizes it to θr according to a probability density p(θr|θs). We use
continuous θ’s here but the argument is identical for discrete θ’s. More generally,
let θ be Eve’s observed signal point, so that θ = θr in a classical noiseless system
with deliberate randomization. Then,
p(θ|x, k′) =
∫
p(θ|θr)p(θr|θs(x, k′))dθr. (1)
In the classical noiseless case with just signal randomization, p(θ|θr) = δ(θ−
θr), the BPSK signal may be correctly discriminated when the observed θ falls
within the half-circle centred around θs. Thus we pick p(θr|θs) to be the uniform
distribution on the half-circle with midpoint θs. If x is uniformly random, then
from (1)
p(θ|k′) = 1
2
∑
x=0,1
p(θ|x, k′) (2)
is the uniform distribution on the full circle independent of k′. This proves the
observation of θ to Eve yields no information at all on k′. In other words, Eve’s
channel on k′ has zero capacity from DSR and uniformly random data which
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acts as added noise unknown to her, similar to a nondegenerate nonrandom
stream cipher.
For coherent-state noise described in the wedge approximation [7, 9], where-
upon a heterodyne or phase measurement the observed θ is taken to be uniformly
distributed within a standard deviation around θr and zero outside, the same
k′−independence for p(θ|k′) obtains when θr is chosen in a discrete number of
positions for given θs so that p(θr|θs) fills out a uniform half-circle again. We
have assumed an integral number of wedges would do this, which can be guar-
anteed by choice of the signal level α0. Going beyond the wedge approximation,
one needs to determine the function p(θr|θs) in (1) for a coherent state/fixed
measurement p(θ|θr) so that p(θ|x, k′) is uniformly distributed in a half-circle,
where p(θ|θr) is obtained from Eve’s optimal individual qumode quantum mea-
surement. In this case, there is the problem that the resulting error probability
for Bob may be higher than the designed level even with knowledge of the seed
key K. In principle, this problem can be handled in one of two different ways
without affecting the data security as measured by the Shannon limit [8, 9].
First, one may increase S and correspondinglyM while maintaining the same
Y-00 random cipher characteristic Γ = M/pi
√
S defined in [9]. Doing so will
make the tail of the probability distribution that causes Bob’s error arbitrarily
small. Indeed, in the classical limit S →∞,M →∞,M/√S → piΓ, a constant,
the error vanishes. A second way is to employ an error correcting code for Bob
and randomize the entire codeword of n-bits in a correlated fashion in the signal
space Cn, where C is the coherent-state circle in R2. This is done by moving the
n-bit codewords within mutually exclusive but jointly exhaustive regions that
fill the entire signal space Cn, similar to the filling of the circle C in the one-bit
case. Detailed quantitative treatment of these will appear elsewhere.
Note that Y-00 is only a random cipher for a given quantum measurement,
it is not a random quantum cipher. See [9]. A convenient way to make it a
quantum random cipher is to randomize the parameter θs to θr that determines
the quantum state ρ(θr) to be transmitted. The resulting output state is then,
analogous to (1),
ρ(x, k′) =
∫
ρ(θr)p(θr|θs(x, k′))dθr. (3)
It may be seen from (3) that by uniformly randomizing θs as above, for any
state modulation ρ(θr), the output quantum state itself is independent of k
′
upon averaging over x as before. Thus, such quantum DSR would protect the
key against CTA with the most general joint (quantum measurement) attack. In
this case, there is generally a larger probability of error that Bob would decide
on x incorrectly as compared to no DSR, similar to the specific coherent state
case under heterodyne attack. One of the above two approaches in the fixed
measurement case can be similarly employed to bring the error down to any
desired level.
It may be noted that the deployment of full DSR just described above is
practically difficult at present if only because high speed random numbers are
needed. On the other hand, it may be possible to delve into the qumode sequence
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to take advantage of the randomization inherent in such sequence for selected
deliberate randomization while providing essentially the same overall result.
Detailed treatment of concrete DSR on Y-00 will be given elsewhere.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that Y-00 can be designed to be secure against fast correlation
attacks including that of ref. [10], and that it can be configured to be more
secure than AES while retaining the same high speed and its advantage as
a physics-based cipher. We also prove the full information-theoretic security
of Y-00 with proper deliberate signal randomization against ciphertext-only
attacks. Quantitative security against known-plaintext attacks, as in the case
of conventional ciphers, is a difficult, open, and important area of research.
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